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We propose a novel method to detect and locate a
Man-in-the-Middle attack in a fixed wireless network by
analyzing round-trip time and measured received signal
strength from fixed access points. The proposed method
was implemented as a client-side application that estab-
lishes a baseline for measured round trip time (RTTs) and
received signal strength (RSS) under no-threat scenarios
and applies statistical measures on the measured RTT
and RSS to detect and locate Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
We show empirically that the presence of a Man-in-the-
Middle attack incurs a significantly longer delay and
larger standard deviation in measured RTT compared to
that measured without a Man-in-the-Middle attack.
We evaluated three machine learning algorithms on the
measured RSS dataset to estimate the location of a
Man-in-the-Middle attacker.
Experimental results show that the proposed method
can effectively detect and locate a Man-in-the-Middle
attack and achieves a mean location estimation error of
0.8 meters in an indoor densely populated metropolitan
environment.
Keywords: Man-in-the-Middle, Wi-Fi, fixed wireless
network, location estimation, timing analysis, machine
learning
1. Introduction
The rapid adoption of mobile devices and wire-
less networks has dramatically increased the de-
mand and deployment of Wi-Fi access points
across different environments, both indoors and
outdoors. These Wi-Fi access points form fixed
wireless networks, where clients and servers on
the network are connected wirelessly through
access points in fixed locations [20]. Since fixed
wireless networks can be easily deployed with
inexpensive commercial hardware, they offer an
advantage over wired networks and are widely
adopted in industrial control networks, wireless
mesh networks, and sensor networks.
Like any other wireless network, fixed wire-
less network faces security challenges and can
be turned into a hostile environment when a
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker is present
within the range of the network. AMITM attack
is considered an active eavesdropping attack,
often carried out on the media access control
(MAC) layer through address resolution proto-
col (ARP) cache poisoning [17]. The purpose
of a MITM attack is to intercept a connection
between two legitimate hosts in the network
by spoofing the MAC addresses of the legiti-
mate nodes and pretending to be the intended
sender or receiver of traffic between two legit-
imate nodes. Once a connection between the
legitimate nodes is intercepted, the attacker can
carry out different kinds of attacks such as cap-
turing traffic between the two nodes, rerouting
traffic to unintended hosts, injecting malicious
code and data to the receiver, or advertising false
services to neighboring wireless stations [12].
A MITM attack can be easily carried out using
publicly available tools with commodity hard-
ware [19]. The easy access of hacking tools and
low cost of attack deployment makes it easy for
attackers to target the popular public and enter-
prise Wi-Fi networks. Detection and defense
of such attacks are critical for these fixed wire-
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less networks to ensure data integrity and secure
connection.
A known quality of a MITM attack is that it in-
troduces delay when a connection is intercepted
or hijacked, as the attacker must buffer and re-
play a signal transmission to the intended re-
ceiver. In a fixed wireless network where the
access points do not change location, an attacker
will provide different signal strength than the
node it is masquerading. This is because the at-
tacker may have different computing hardware
from the victims’, and they may be physically
closer or farther from the intended receiver.
In this paper, we demonstrated a testbed setup
to conduct a MITM attack through commodity
hardware in a fixed network in a densely popu-
lated metropolitan area, which poses unique
challenges due to the large number of sources
of interference. We showed the features of the
network measurement data in terms of round-
trip time (RTT) and received signal strength
(RSS) with legitimate traffic between a client
and a server nodes, without a MITM attacker
and under the MITM attack. We propose a
method of detecting and locating a MITM at-
tack occurring between two nodes in a fixed
wireless network by comparing the difference
in measured RTT and Wi-Fi received signal
strength indicator (RSSI) values with the mean
and standard deviations of the RTTs and RSSIs,
respectively. We apply three machine learning
algorithms: Gaussian Naive Bayes, K Nearest
Neighbors, and Support Vector Machine, on the
RSS dataset to estimate the location of an at-
tacker and compare their performance on pre-
diction accuracy and time complexity in fitting
and predicting phases. We also expose the fac-
tors that may impact the location prediction ac-
curacy in fixed wireless networks in densely
populated metropolitan areas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents the related work.
Section 3 introduces our experimental testbed
setup and our proposed method that uses round-
trip time delay measurement and received sig-
nal strength to detect and locate MITM attacks.
Section 4 presents our experimental results and
discussion. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2. Related Work
It is possible to detect MITM attacks by ob-
serving abnormal variation of networkmeasure-
ments with its empirical data such as delay and
signal strength [3, 14, 11, 6, 2, 7, 23, 1, 18, 8].
An abnormal network behavior (longer delay
and variances in received signal strength) may
be caused by disturbances in the physical layer
such as collision of packets due to increased
transmission requests over the wireless links or
due to an intercepted connection. Since the
MITM attacks incur time delay for the attacker
to spoof the address of the intended sender and
receiver to the other party [6, 2], it is possible to
detect a MITM attack by carefully sampling and
measuring the RTTs while traffic is transmitted
between a sender and a receiver.
A clock synchronization protocol was proposed
that uses affine clocks to synchronize data trans-
mission on any channel and proves the possibil-
ity of detecting a MITM attack by identifying
the attacker-delayed packets [3]. This protocol
securely synchronizes clocks over any link by
passing timestamped messages, which ensures
that any connection can only introduce constant
delay. This protocol also enables that any at-
tacker imposing a non-constant delay can be
detected by the legitimate receiving nodes.
A modification of media access control (MAC)
layer protocol is presented to detect the MITM
attack, which is based on the fact that a suc-
cessful attack must ensure acknowledgement
(ACK) is received within the ACK Timeout pe-
riod [8]. This detection strategy uses the fact
that sender and receiver secretly agree that cer-
tain frames must not be acknowledged on their
first transmission. This way the MITM attacker
will be exposedwhen the frame was sent and ac-
knowledged by the attacker while the legitimate
nodes remain silent.
This method first adds a test to detect unauthen-
tic acknowledgements in the send procedure,
then the receive procedure ismodified by adding
a test to the corresponding frame and suppresses
the initial ACK, and finally an extra procedure
to implement the suppress-ACK function that
coordinates the sender and the receiver to agree
on the frames whose initial ACK should be sup-
pressed. Even though this method introduced a
very high detection rate, the implementation of
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modified MAC protocol is difficult. Especially
in some equipment, the MAC protocol cannot
be re-programed because of the implementation
in hardware or interface firmware.
Physical-layer information, such as RSS, is hard
to forge arbitrarily and can be used to detect
MITM attack. In a fixed wireless network, the
wireless access points often do not change lo-
cation and the users are usually stationary when
they use the service. The RSS of the Wi-Fi
access points sensed at the intended receivers
would be different from that of an unintended
transmitter located at a different location. An
attacker will have an unexpected WiFi RSS dif-
ferent than the node it is masquerading. This
is because the attacker has different hardware,
and may be physically located closer to or far-
ther from the receiver than the node measuring
the expected signal strength.
A methodwas proposed to detect MITM attacks
usingRSSI valuesmeasured at the receiver node
[11]. The effect of changing a few parameters
over the RSSI values of the data packets re-
ceived at the receiver node in order to find that
the variation of RSSI values could identify the
location changing of the sender nodes. It would
be interesting to see if these results can be re-
produced using different computing platforms
and wireless hardware.
Another approach builds RSS profiles and de-
tects spoofing based on Gaussian mixture mod-
els (GMM) [23]. This method shows that an-
tenna diversity is the root cause of the multi-
modal RSS distributions. The difference in
mean RSSI by using two antennas for either
transmitting or receiving can be high enough to
impact the detection accuracy of existing algo-
rithms and the multi-modal RSS patterns can be
defined in GMM. However, the driver for Wi-Fi
device could reduce the signal to noise ratio and
further reduce the detection accuracy.
In this paper, we propose a simple detection and
localization framework to counter MITM attack
in fixed wireless network in densely populated
metropolitan areas where interference and mul-
tipath may have higher impact in the physical
layer properties.
3. Proposed MITM Attack Detection
Method
In this section, we present the attacker model
and the proposed method to detect and locate a
MITM attack occurring between two nodes in
a fixed wireless network using a client-side ap-
plication that uses the measured RTT and Wi-
Fi RSS. We deployed a testbed to simulate a
MITM attack through ARP cache poisoning us-
ing commodity hardware in a suburban area.
We also evaluated the accuracy of locating the
node using RSS dataset collected in a densely
populated metropolitan building through three
machine learning techniques.
3.1. MITM Attack through ARP Cache
Poisoning
MITM attacks are often carried out by an at-
tacker through ARP cache poisoning which fa-
kes the network identity of the attacker for the
other nodes in the network to believe it to be
a designated server or a network node. Figure
1 shows the timing diagram of an ARP cache
poisoning attack. Nodes A and B are the le-
gitimate nodes in the network. The MITM at-
tacker broadcasts its ARP requests to all nodes
in the network to learn the MAC addresses of
the server and the client. Once it has the MAC
addresses of Nodes A and B, it sends an ARP
reply to the client, B to make Node B associate
its MAC address to the server, Node A. Since
ARP is trusting, it will accept the ARP reply and
believe the MITM attacker is the server in the
Figure 1. Timing diagram for case study of ARP cache
poisoning attack.
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network. Hence, the name ARP cache poison-
ing. So when Node A sends packets to Node B,
all the packets are sent to theMITM attacker and
the MITM attacker can simply eavesdrop what
is being communicated or alter the message and
forward it to Node A.
3.2. Attack Model
In this study, the MITM attack involves an at-
tacker, a legitimate access point (AP) whose
MAC address is spoofed by the attacker, and a
victim who is deceived to believe the attacker is
the intended AP. We assume both the attacker
and the victim use off-the-shelf devices that use
hardware and firmware that support standard
802.11 protocols, thewireless channels between
the communicating parties are half-duplex. We
also assume the attacker has the capability of
manipulating the fields of the 802.11 frames
to change the source and destination MAC ad-
dresses, BSSID, ESSID, sequence number, etc.
to intercept an intended connection between the
victim and the legitimate AP, however, with no
access to change the physical layer information
such as timestamp and signal strength. We do
not make any assumption of the type of anten-
nas used in these devices. A detailed attack
procedure is presented in Subsection 3.3.
3.3. Testbed Setup
3.3.1. Testbed Environment
We created our testbed in a residential room
in a suburban environment where Wi-Fi traffic
is moderate for RTT measurement approach to
detect MITM attack and in a high-rise building
in a densely populated metropolitan environ-
ment for estimation of location of the network
node. For detection of MITM by the RTT mea-
surement approach, we carried out the experi-
ments in a confined suburban testbed to perform
MITM attacks. Figure 2 depicts the test envi-
ronment. The dimension of the test environ-
ment was 5 m×4 m. The test environment was
divided into grids using a cartesian coordinate
system with each point 1 meter apart from its
neighboring points. The client node was placed
at (0, 0) and the server node was placed at (5,3).
The client and the server were 6.4 meters apart.
Figure 2. Floor plan of the experiment setup.
The client and server nodes were two laptops
running Ubuntu 13.10. The applications were
implemented in Python. The client and server
nodes had external Alfa AWUS 036H Network
Interface Card utilizing the RTL8187 chipset
that supports 802.11 b/g. This adapter was
chosen for its flexibility as it supports all Wi-
Fi communication modes. Both the client and
server utilized a 9Bi antenna for a stable con-
nection between them.
For a baseline reading, the client application
took RTT and RSSI readings of the server with
1000 iterations. We use the expected values of
RTT and RSSI measured without the presence
of an attacker as baselines for our experiments.
3.3.2. MITM Attack Deployment
The MITM attacker was simulated using a lap-
top running Ubuntu Linux 13.10. We used Et-
tercap [5] and Arpspoof [4] to carry out MITM
attacks in our experiments. Ettercap is a com-
prehensive suite for MITM attacks. It provides
more functions in tuning the parameters for an
ARP cache poisoning attack. The user can cali-
brate the parameters to do anARP cache poison-
ing attack between the sender and the receiver
node. It is also imperative that the attacker was
running as a Half-Duplex attacker. This will
introduce the most delay when relaying traffic
between the sender and receiver.
Another tool we used to deploy the MITM at-
tack is Arpspoof, which is available in the dsniff
package [4]. Arpspoof is a lightweight MITM
attack tool that can be initiated from the Linux
command line environment. Arpspoof works
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by sending out ARP requests to the client and
server machines, in turn learning their MAC ad-
dresses when it receives their ARP replies. It
then sends out ARP replies to the client and
server, rewriting their ARP tables so they be-
lieve the attacker running the Arpspoof is the
intended receiver. The server believes the at-
tacker is the client, and the client will believe
the attacker is the server. Any traffic between
the client and server will be relayed through
the MITM attacker. In our experiment, the
ARP replieswere sent every 2 seconds, ensuring
the client and server ARP tables are constantly
rewritten.
3.4. Proposed Man-in-the-Middle Detection
Method
The proposed MITM detection method utilizes
and detects the delay variance between a nor-
mal transmission and an intercepted transmis-
sion between two nodes. Figure 3 shows the
timing diagram of packet transmission between
two network nodes A and B when the packets
are intercepted and relayed by a MITM attacker.
The RTT of the transmission between nodes A
and B increased by 2 × mBA, where mBA was
the processing time at the MITM machine for
packet buffering and forwarding.
To measure RTT from the client to the server,
we developed a client application using Python.
The server host IP address, port number, and
timeout are defined in the initial set up. A socket
object is created and connected with the server
application. When a successful connection is
Figure 3. Timing diagram of an ARP cache poisoning
attack.
established, a message is sent to the server. The
client then receives the acknowledgement mes-
sage back from the server to confirm the receipt
of the packet. The RTT is measured by taking
the difference between the message send time
and message receive time.
We modified the client application based on
Ping to get statistical measurements. The client
application sends ICMP packets to the server,
awaits ICMP echos from the server, and calcu-
lates the RTT. We take the measurements of the
average, minimum, maximum, and standard de-
viation of RTT and the percentage of lost pack-
ets.
The application records theRSSI from the server
as well as the average, minimum, maximum,
and standard deviation of the RSS in dBm. In
the case of a single Wi-Fi access point, the ref-
erence points may be limited to get accurate
location estimations. In a densely populated
metropolitan environment we use IT infrastruc-
ture as our testbed to estimate the locationwhere
multiple Wi-Fi access points can be heard by
the receiver at the same time. We conducted
our experiments on the 6th floor of the Edward
Guiliano building at NewYork Institute of Tech-
nology’s Manhattan Campus. The 6th floor
contains three Wi-Fi Access Points (AP) spaced
evenly throughout the inverted “U” shaped hall-
way. As seen in Figure 4, we selected 26 refer-
ence points, labeled A through Z, and marked
the AP locations. The distance from each ref-
erence point, A through Z, is approximately 1.5
meters.
Figure 4. Floor plan of the 6th floor of the Edward
Guiliano Global Center Building at NYIT.
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Wi-Fi signals are electromagnetic waves that
propagate through transmission media. The sig-
nal loses its strength as it’s transmitted over a
distance. Free-space path loss is defined as the
loss in signal strength in free space (air). The
indoor path loss equation estimates the path loss
inside a room or closed-in area inside a building
that is surrounded bywalls [21]. Eqn. 1 is a stan-
dard indoor path loss function, which requires
a number of variables in order to determine the
path loss [21].
L = 20 log10(f )+N log10(d)+Lf (n)−28 (1)
Here, L denotes the indoor path loss and is mea-
sured in decibels (dB). N denotes the distance
power loss coefficient (dB) which can be ob-
tained from the table given below:
Residential Office Commercial
28 30 22
Our experiment environment is matched to the
“Office” type from the table as this building has
neither a “Residential” or “Commercial" lay-
out. f represents frequency of the transmitted
signal. The Wi-Fi signals we are measuring
in our experiments use 802.11n standard and
have a frequency of 2.4 GHz. d represents the
distance between nodes inmeters, and is the dis-
tance between our reference points and access
points. Lf and n are parts of the floor pene-
tration factor where n is the number of floors.
In this experiment we are only using one floor,
therefore Lf (n) is 0. Eqn. 1 is reduced to:
L = 39.6 + 30 log10(d) (2)





The indoor path loss equation is a measurement
of signal loss and not the signal strength. In or-
der to find signal strength, we must use another
equation called the Link Budget to calculate re-
ceived signal strength at the receiver (PRX) [9].
This accounts for transmit power (PRX), trans-
mit antenna gain (GTX), receive antenna gain
(GRX), along with path loss.
PRX = PTX + GTX + GRX − L (4)
We assume that the power of our transmitter
(dBm), power of our receiver (dBm), and gain
of our transmitter and receiver (dB) are constant
with respect to our hardware. This means that
only path loss relies on the distance. Therefore,
we make the assumption that path loss is equal
to received signal strength in our experiments.
We proceed to measure the distance from each
access point to the reference point and then use
the measured Wi-Fi signal strength at each ref-
erence point to determine the distance by using
the indoor path loss equation.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. MITM Detection through RTT
Measurement
In the MITM detection experiment, we mea-
sured the RTTs at every grid point in the sub-
urban testbed. Based on 1000 measurements at
each point, we observed that in a clean connec-
tion between the client and the server without
MITM attacks, the average RTT was consis-
tently below 3.4 ms, with a standard deviation
of about 2 ms. Figure 5 shows the results of
RTT measurements at points (0, 3) and (3, 2)
with a normal connection and a connection un-
der MITM attack.
A clean connection experienced zero ICMP
packet loss. Based on the hardware of our server
machine, the client reads the RSSI of the server
consistently at −58 dBm, with a standard de-
viation of 2.62 dBm. The average RTT under
MITM attack for all points was found to be 2.4
times the baseline average of a clean connec-
tion.
With the presence of a MITM attacker halfway
between the client and the server, the RTT could
jump to 51 ms, with an observed 25 percent
packet loss. Because the MITM attacker was
running on a low-power netbook, the observed
RSShad an average of−45 dBm with a standard
deviation of 26 dBm.
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Figure 5. Histogram of measured RTT at locations (3, 2) under normal connection and under MITM attack.
4.2. Locating a MITM Attacker through RSS
Measurement
To estimate the location of a MITM attacker,
we used the dataset collected at the NYIT 6th
floor testbed with recorded RSS data measured
on a laptop at measurement points A through Z.
The dataset included approximately 500−1000
RSS records from each access point measured
at each location during July 2013 [10]. We eval-
uated three machine learning algorithms to pre-
dict the location of the node: Gaussian Naive
Bayes (GNB), K Nearest Neighbors (KNN),
and Support Vector Machines (SVM). We used
half of the dataset as training set and the other
half of the dataset as test set. We used the scikit-
learn (sklearn) python machine learning library
in our experiments [22].
P(y|x1, · · · xn, ) = P(x1, · · · xn|y)P(y)P(x1, · · · xn) (5)
Naive Bayes theorem is based on the Bayes’
theorem as shown in (5) and gets its name from
the strong assumption that each feature is inde-
pendent of any other feature. This assumption is
often false in real world applications. However,
despite this assumption, Naive Bayes has been
proven to perform well in certain cases, espe-
cially where the number of training samples is
small [13]. In an effort to achieve high accuracy
whilst reducing pre-deployment efforts, we se-
lect this method of computing the probabilities
of the locations’ given measurements. In our
study, the RSS measurements are assumed to
follow Gaussian distribution which follows the





KNearestNeighbor algorithm is a simple classi-
fication algorithm that finds theKnearest neigh-
bors of an element and categorizes the element
to the class most of its neighbors belong to. In
our experiment, we use K = 5 and Minkowski
distance in calculating the nearest neighbors to
classify an RSS measurement. Minkowski dis-






q is the power parameter. When q = 1, it is
equivalent to Manhattan distance, q = 2, it is
equivalent to Euclidean distance. Here, we use
q = 2 in our experiments.
Several algorithms used to detect nearest neigh-
bors are provided by sklearn, including brute
force, ball tree and KD tree. With the size of
dataset N, the time complexity of the brute force
query is O(N) and tree-based query is O(logN).
However, for tree-based nearest neighbor al-
gorithm, the complexity of constructing a tree
in the fitting phase is O(NlogN). For smaller
samples, with size N less than 30, brute force
algorithm is faster due to its small overhead.
When sample size is larger than 30, tree-based
algorithm has an advantage because of its log-
arithmic growth in the query phase. In our
experiment, we use the default option where
sklearn will automatically choose the most ef-
ficient nearest neighbors based on the sample
size.
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Sklearn provides several SVM classifiers, in-
cluding SVC, NuSVC and LinearSVC. Here,
we choose support vector classification (SVC),
which is a C-Support Vector Classification (C-
SVC) implementation based on libsvm [16].
SVC in sklearn supports multi-class classifica-
tion using the “one-against-one” approach [15].
In our experiment, we use radial basis function
(rbf) kernel with penalty parameter C of C-SVC
set to 1.0.
Figure 6 shows the percentage of accurate pre-
dictions for each measurement location using
the GNB, KNN, and SVM machine learning
algorithms. The results show that for major-
ity of the locations, the prediction accuracy is
high (over 80% of the prediction is accurate).
Some locations have very poor prediction ac-
curacy, e.g. locations S, V , and W. The reason
for this poor estimation is the fact that these
points are located next to the mechanical rooms
where magnetic interference is very high and
the RSS measurements could be skewed by the
interference.
In this paper, we use Euclidean distance to cal-
culate the estimation error. Figure 7 shows the
cumulative distribution of the estimation error
of the three machine learning algorithms on the
RSS dataset. The mean estimation errors for
the GNB, KNN, and SVM are 0.9034 meters,
0.8325 meters, and 1.3242 meters, respectively.
The standard deviation for the GNB, KNN, and
SVM are 2.1603 meters, 2.1158 meters, and
3.117 meters, respectively. This shows that
KNN and GNB have very close estimation er-
rors and they both outperform SVM for this
dataset. KNN and GNB have 90% of the esti-
mation errors below 2 meters, while SVM can
Figure 7. Location prediction accuracy comparison of
Gaussian Naive Bayes, K Nearest Neighbors, and
Support Vector Machines.
only achieve estimation errors below 4.5 meters
at the 90 percentile.
Table 1 compares the prediction accuracy and
complexity of the three machine learning algo-
rithms for location estimation. KNN and GNB
have better prediction accuracy than SVM, as
shown in Figure 7. The two phases of machine
learning include fitting (training) phase and pre-
diction phase. For our dataset, GNB and KNN
have similar performance in time complexity.
Since tree-based query is adopted for KNN, the
fitting phase includes tree building which has
complexity of O(KNlogN). This could make
it slower than GNB in the fitting phase. How-
ever, fitting is usually done offline and does not
impact the prediction speed. SVM is more com-
plex to implement (the complexity of the fitting
phase could be O(n2), and the complexity of
the prediction phase is dependent on the num-
ber of support vectors generated) and therefore,
Figure 6. Location prediction accuracy comparison of Gaussian Naive Bayes, K Nearest Neighbors, and Support
Vector Machines.
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Table 1. Performance comparison of the applied
machine learning algorithms.
has the highest complexity among the three al-
gorithms. For our dataset, SVM underperforms
KNN and GNB in both prediction accuracy and
complexity.
To preserve energy and computing resources,
the proposed method implements the client ap-
plication thatmeasures the averageRTT through
modified ping program and detects if it exceeds
a threshold (in our experiment, the threshold is
set to 2.4 times the baseline RTT average). If
an abnormal RTT is detected, the system will
call the prediction scheme using KNN or GNB
on the gathered RSS values from the clients and
servers, to further confirm the presence and es-
timate the location of the MITM attacker. The
key indicator in our results was the increased
RTT and variation in RSS measurements com-
pared to the baseline values.
5. Conclusions
We propose a novel method to identify a Man-
-in-the-Middle attack between two nodes in a
fixed wireless network by analyzing the mea-
sured round-trip time and received signal
strength from Wi-Fi access points. To evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed method, we
use a fixed wireless network testbed compris-
ing a client, a server, and an attacker machine in
a room designated as the test environment. The
proposed method evaluates round trip time and
received signal strength at the client, and cal-
culates the mean and the standard deviations
of the measured RTTs and RSS. These val-
ues are used as baselines to detect Man-in-the-
Middle attacks. We show that the presence of
a Man-in-the-Middle attack incurs significantly
longer delay and larger standard deviation in
measured RTT compared to that measured with-
out a Man-in-the-Middle attack. The measured
RSS also provides indication of the difference
in distance where the designated server and the
Man-in-the-Middle attacker is located. To lo-
cate theMan-in-the-Middle attacker, we applied
and compared K Nearest Neighbors, Gaussian
Naive Bayes, and Support Vector Machine ma-
chine learning algorithms on the collected RSS
dataset from a densely populated metropolitan
building. Results show that K Nearest Neigh-
bors and Gaussian Naive Bayes provide less
than 2-meter estimation error 90% of the times
with a mean estimation error of 0.8 and 0.9
meters, respectively. The proposed method in-
tegrates the delay and signal strength variables
to detect and locate a Man-in-the-Middle at-
tacker with high estimation accuracy and low
complexity.
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